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Abstract
Preferences are traditionally assumed to be stable. However, empirical evidence such as preference modulation following
choices calls this assumption into question. The evolution of such postchoice preference over long time spans, even when
choices have been explicitly forgotten, has so far not been studied. In two experiments, we investigated this question by
using a variant of the free choice paradigm: In a first session, participants evaluated the pleasantness of a number of odors.
We then formed pairs of similarly rated odors, and asked participants to choose their favorite, for each pair. Participants
were then presented with all odors again, and asked for another pleasantness rating. In a second session 1 week later, a
third pleasantness rating was obtained, and participants were again asked to choose between the same options. Results
suggested postchoice preference modulation immediately and 1 week after choice for both chosen and rejected options,
even when choices were not explicitly remembered. A third experiment, using another paradigm, confirmed that choice can
have a modulatory impact on preferences, and that this modulation can be long-lasting. Taken together, these findings
suggest that although preferences appear to be flexible because they are modulated by choices, this modulation also
appears to be stable over time and even without explicit recollection of the choice. These results bring a new argument to
the idea that postchoice preference modulation could rely on implicit mechanisms, and are consistent with the recent
proposal that cognitive dissonance reduction could to some extent be implicit.
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Introduction
Preferences are typically assumed to be stable over time [1,2]
and are accordingly often described as relatively stable evaluations
of stimuli in terms of pleasantness (see e.g., [3]). Despite long-
standing research in psychology, neuroscience, and economics,
understanding the sources and determinants of individual prefer-
ences remains a scientific challenge. Empirical evidence indicates
that preferences are flexible in the sense that they could be
modulated by cognitive variables such as familiarity [4,5] and
choices (e.g., [6,7]). In the first experiment to address the question
of how preferences could be modulated by choices, Brehm used
the so-called free-choice paradigm and showed that just after a choice
between two options evaluated as similarly desirable, that is, a
difficult choice, participants rated the chosen option as more
desirable and the rejected option as less desirable than they had
rated them during the first evaluation.
Results from the free-choice paradigm have typically been
explained by the cognitive dissonance reduction hypothesis [8]. In
this context, cognitive dissonance corresponds to an aversive
psychological state, which results from the conflict induced by the
choice between the undesirable features of the chosen option and
the desirable features of the rejected option [9,10]. Cognitive
dissonance reduction could be achieved by evaluating the chosen
option more positively and the rejected option less positively. The
reduction of cognitive dissonance is mostly thought to require
conscious strategies and to be mediated by the accessibility of
dissonant cognitions to one’s awareness [8,11–16]. Consequently,
this hypothesis requires an explicit memory of the choice [17,18].
In addition to previous works having questioned awareness in
cognitive dissonance (e.g., [19–21]), recent research has challenged
the proposition that preference modulation following choice
requires explicit memory. For instance, postchoice change in
ranking have been shown in amnesic patients [18] whose brain
lesion prevents them from remembering their choice, as well as in
young children and capucin monkeys [22]. In healthy adult
participants, Coppin and colleagues [7] have shown that
pleasantness ratings were modified after choice, even when the
choice was not explicitly remembered. The novel idea of their
study was to use olfactory stimuli, which are known for evoking
highly flexible responses [23,24] and, in this respect, are
particularly well suited to studying implicit memory [25]. Indeed,
after the classical steps of the free-choice paradigm (ratings
followed by choice, followed by new ratings), Coppin and
colleagues [7] added an unexpected memory task about the
choice made. The results suggested postchoice preference change
in the sense of an increased evaluation of chosen odors and a
decreased evaluation of rejected odors, even when choices were
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relevant because it provides a more controlled basis for ruling out
any explanation of postchoice pleasantness rating changes in terms
of experimental demand, which has been identified as a critical
bias when investigating postchoice preference modulation. Taken
together, these results suggest that preference modulation follow-
ing choice does not require explicit mechanisms. Instead, implicit
mechanisms that are not necessarily accessible to conscious
knowledge can apparently be sufficient to produce postchoice
preference modulation.
Although the free-choice paradigm has been widely used during
the last 50 years [26], to the best of our knowledge only a few
previous studies have addressed the general issue of how stable the
postchoice preference changes are over time. Frey and colleagues
[27] have investigated postchoice attractiveness ratings modulation
for books at four different time intervals (immediately, 3, 10, or
30 min after choice). They showed that the attractiveness ratings
increase of chosen stimuli and the attractiveness ratings decrease of
rejected stimuli (spreading of alternatives) were significant
immediately after choice and stayed constant at the different time
intervals included in this study. Walster [28] studied spreading of
alternatives (jobs) immediately, 4, 15, and 90 min after choice.
The results showed no postchoice attractiveness ratings change
immediately after choice; increased attractiveness ratings for
rejected stimuli and decreased attractiveness ratings for chosen
stimuli attributed to postdecision regret after 4 min; increased
attractiveness ratings for chosen stimuli and decreased attractive-
ness ratings for rejected stimuli after 15 min; and no attractiveness
rating change 90 min after choice compared with before choice.
Thus, the results of this study seem to indicate that postchoice
attractiveness rating change is unstable over time and has already
disappeared after 90 min. Few studies have investigated longer
time spans (weeks or months) of postchoice pleasantness rating
modulation for chosen stimuli [29–31]. Svenson and Benthorn
[31] requested participants to make a choice between two
alternatives of the same nature (e.g., stereos). Each of these
alternatives was described in terms of four different attributes
ranging from ‘‘very poor’’ to ‘‘very good’’ (e.g., price, design,
sound quality, and overall quality of a set). Either immediately or 1
week later, participants were requested to judge how good or bad
the alternatives were on the different characteristics. Their goal
was consequently not to investigate the unfolding over time of
pleasantness of alternatives as such, but of characteristics associated
with alternatives. The results showed a significant increase in the
quality ratings of the two most important attributes related to the
chosen alternative after 1 week but not immediately after
the decision. Gilbert and Ebert [29] showed an increased liking
rating for a chosen stimulus (print), even 11 days after the choice,
when participants did not have the opportunity to change their
choice. To the contrary, Ritov [30] investigated the pleasure
experienced with small gifts (desk organizer or paper holder)
immediately and between 6 and 8 weeks after a choice varying in
difficulty. The study showed a significant decrease of satisfaction
rating with time. Vroom and Deci [32] found a very similar result
regarding attitudes of graduate students towards the organization
they chose to begin their career in: the attractiveness rating of the
organization decreased during the first year after the choice, and
stayed low during the next two and half years.
However, the results of all the above-mentioned studies have
been recently rendered ambiguous. The methodology of the free-
choice paradigm has indeed been under lively discussion recently,
with a focus on what controls are appropriate when analyzing
whether the choice phase truly causes a modulation in preferences
(e.g., [33–38]).
Chen and Risen [34] provided a mathematical argument that
under certain assumptions it is possible to measure postchoice
preference change in the free-choice paradigm, even if the
underlying preferences are actually stable. Sufficient assumptions
to get this result are that (a) participants’ ratings are, at least
partially, guided by their preferences; (b) participants’ choices are,
at least partially, guided by their preferences (so that choices can
reveal preferences); and (c) preferences cannot be perfectly
measured by ratings. The authors formally derived that if these
three assumptions hold, then the initial similarity of ratings
between the chosen versus the rejected stimuli (that are presented
in difficult pairs in the choice phase) may be due to errors in rating
measures of an underlying stable ‘‘true’’ preference. The choice
may then simply reveal which of the two had already initially been
preferred. Consequently, during the second rating, one would also
expect participants to rate the chosen stimuli as more pleasant and
the rejected stimuli as less pleasant than during the first rating.
This means that a measured postchoice preference change may
not necessarily be driven by an influence of choice on preferences,
but could also be an artifact caused by the way data are
nonrandomly analyzed according to the choice, which reveals
information about the underlying stable preferences. It is
important to note that this criticism does not apply to other
paradigms classically used to study cognitive dissonance, such as
the effort-justification paradigm and the induced-compliance
paradigm.
Ontheempiricalside,ChenandRisen[34]suggestedcomparing
the chosen spread in the classical rating-choice-rating (RCR)
sequence with a control condition that modifies the sequence of
measurements–a rating-rating-choice (RRC) condition–in which
choicecanrevealpreferencesbutnotinfluencethesecondrating.In
a first empirical application, they could not find a difference in
postchoice preference change betweenRCR and RRC. Ina second
study, the authors found a marginally significant difference (p=.06)
between these sequences of measurement (RCR vs. RRC),
suggesting the existence of choice-induced preference changes.
Recent works have addressed Chen and Risen’s [34] arguments
both formally and empirically. One strand of work has scrutinized
the formal basis of Chen and Risen’s argument [37–39], whereas
another has provided empirical evidence that demonstrated an
influence of choice on preferences despite Chen and Risen’s point
[35,36,40].
On the theoretical side, Sagarin and Skrowonski [37,38] argued
that Chen and Risen’s argument ‘‘rests on the unwarranted assumption
that the…] choice provides a perfectly reliable measure of subjects’ preference for
the chosen item over the unchosen item’’. They formally showed that the
more random the choices, the less important Chen and Risen’s
argument. How randomly choices reflect ‘‘true’’ preferences for
similarly rated stimuli remains an empirical question–that is, the
results derived with standard methodology are not necessarily
rendered meaningless by Chen and Risen’s argument.
Moreover, two recent studies [35,40] have empirically demon-
strated postchoice preference modulation when choice is manipulated,
thus establishing the effect in circumstances in which Chen and
Risen’s argument does not seem to apply. Sharot et al. [40] used a
‘‘blind’’ choice, that is, a choice that participants were not actually
making, even if they had the feeling that they did. Note that this
strategy has also been recognized by Risen and Chen [41] as a
valid approach to address the methodological issue under scrutiny.
In such a paradigm, choice cannot be logically conceived as
revealing anything about preference, yet results still showed
reliable postchoice preference modulation. Furthermore, in a
recent study conducted by Izuma et al. [36], postchoice preference
change observed in RCR was shown to be significantly larger than
Long-Term Shaping Preferences of Odors by Choices
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postchoice preference modulation in terms of both ratings and
brain activity levels, after controlling for the information revealed
by choice. This empirical evidence suggests that Chen and Risen’s
point should be taken into account in explaining a part of the effect
that was previously exclusively attributed to postchoice modula-
tion. Even if this effect of choice on preference is not as strong as
previously thought, it still seems to be more than a mere artifact of
the free choice paradigm, i.e. that there is a psychological
influence of choice on preferences.
The present series of experiments emphasizes four aspects that
were not included as the main focus in the studies previously
described. The first and most crucial aspect is that in the research
we report here, we added a control (Experiment 3) for this issue
raised by Chen and Risen. This control confirms the robustness of
postchoice preference change to settings in which Chen and
Risen’s [34] point does not apply. The second aspect is the
investigation of postchoice pleasantness rating modulation across
long time spans for chosen, but also for rejected, alternatives. The
third aspect is the assessment of experienced utility [42], that is, the
subjective pleasure experienced with a stimulus, and not the
predicted utility, that is, the beliefs about the subjective pleasure
experience with a stimulus. In Ritov’s study [30], participants were
asked by phone to assess the pleasure of the chosen option.
However, this method might not be the optimal way to study long-
term preference evolution over time. Indeed, such a question does
not allow an optimal assessment of experienced utility [42]. An
advantage of actually presenting olfactory stimuli in the series of
experiments is that it directly impacts experienced utility. The
fourth aspect emphasized by our studies is the investigation of the
role of choice memory for postchoice pleasantness rating
modulation across long time spans. Indeed, no study to date has
considered whether postchoice pleasasantness rating modulation is
stable over time when choices are forgotten. However, studying
the influence of choice memory is relevant because it provides a
more controlled basis for ruling out any explanation of postchoice
pleasantness rating changes in terms of experimental demand.
According to impression management theory [43], participants
would want to give a good impression of themselves to the
experimenter and might then report evaluations consistent with
the choices they had previously made, even if such evaluations
were not genuine. The study designed here addresses this matter
because such a motivation is difficult to conceive in the absence of
an explicit memory of the choice.
In summary, no study, to the best of our knowledge, has
thoroughly rejected the possibility that postchoice preference
modulation–for both chosen and rejected stimuli and during the experienced
pleasantness elicited by an actual presentation of these stimuli–is not an
epiphenomenon, fading away after some time has passed.
Crucially, no study so far have investigated postchoice preference
modulation in long time spans in controlling that this effect is not
an artifact of the free-choice paradigm [34]. Moreover, even if
postchoice preference modulation appears stable over time when
the choice is explicitly remembered, one could not rule out an
explanation in terms of experimental demands. A stronger test of
the hypothesis that postchoice preference modulation appears
stable over time is therefore to test whether the effect is still present
after a long delay even when the choice itself has been forgotten.
This question was also address here by experimentally investigat-
ing the long-term evolution of postchoice olfactory preferences
over time, even when choices themselves are forgotten.
We conducted a series of three experiments in order to address
these questions. Specifically, in the first two experiments, using an
adapted version of the free-choice paradigm, we tested whether
postchoice preference modulation can be robust for a 1-week
interval and whether results vary depending on participants’
explicit memory of their initial choices. In the third experiment,
using a paradigm addressing recent criticisms regarding the true
impact of choices on preferences [34], we aimed at confirming that
choice can have a modulatory impact on preferences, and that this
modulation can be long-lasting. Those aims were achieved.
Experiment 1
Method
Ethics statement. This first experiment, as well as Experi-
ments 2 and 3, part of the EmOdor project, have been approved
by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Sciences
of Education (FPSE) at the University of Geneva. All participants
were over 18 and gave a written consent form.
Participants. Forty-one University of Geneva students (33
females, 8 males; mean age=24.5167.53 years) took part in this
experiment. Before starting the experiment, participants complet-
ed a written consent form. All participants reported a normal sense
of smell. They were individually tested and were paid 15 Swiss
Francs (about 15 US Dollars) for their participation. During the
days of testing, they were asked not to wear any fragrance.
Stimuli. Sixteen odorants (provided by Firmenich, SA) were
selected on the basis of their ratings of pleasantness, familiarity,
and intensity obtained from previous studies [4,7,44]. To hinder
odor recognition, we excluded very familiar odors because of the
probability of their being easily recognized [45]. We also excluded
odors that were extreme in valence or intensity. The mean ratings
of the selected odors are provided in Table 1. Odorants were
diluted in odorless dipropylene glycol to obtain a roughly similar
mean intensity (see [4], for further details). Solutions (4 ml) were
injected into the absorbent core of cylindrical felt-tip pens (14 cm
long, inner diameter 1.3 cm). The use of these devices (provided
by Burghart, Germany) avoids any olfactory contamination of the
environment. Each odorant was coded by a random three-digit
code.
Procedure. The present experiment was divided into two
parts, separated by 1 week. The time of day of the experimental
session was unchanged for a given participant.
First session. First, we assessed the individual’s ratings of
pleasantness, familiarity, and intensity for 8 of the 16 odors (target
odors). On the basis of these first pleasantness ratings, four pairs
were created for the choice phase. During this choice phase,
participants were presented with two kinds of odor pairs: (a) two
pairs of odors that they had rated as very similarly pleasant (i.e.,
difficult choice conditions for one half of the trials; mean rating
differences=0.3160.39 on the 10-point subjective scale described
in the following paragraph), and (b) two pairs of odors that they
had rated very differently for pleasantness (i.e., easy choice
conditions for one half of the trials; mean rating differenc-
es=3.0761.28 on the 10-point subjective scale described in the
following paragraph). Second, for each pair, participants were
required to choose the odor they preferred. Third, after these
choices had been made, participants were again requested to assess
the pleasantness, familiarity, and intensity of the eight odors (see
Table 1). Finally, participants were presented with the eight
already presented target odors, together with eight new odors
(distractors) and were requested to indicate whether they had
already smelled each odor during the experiment. For each odor,
if they answered yes, they were then asked to specify if they had
designated this odor as chosen or rejected during the choice phase.
Before being asked to do so at the end of the experiment,
participants were not aware that they would have to complete this
Long-Term Shaping Preferences of Odors by Choices
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odors or pairs of odors were presented was controlled. For each
presentation of the odor, participants were instructed to smell the
odor during two inspirations at most.
Second session 1 week later. First, participants were asked
to assess the pleasantness of the eight odorants already used during
the first session. Second, they were asked to choose the odor they
preferred for the same pairs of odors that they were presented with
during the first session, 1 week before. These pairs were specific to
a given participant, as they were created during the first session on
the basis of participant’s first pleasantness ratings.
Subjective ratings for the two sessions. After each
odorant presentation (except during the choice phases), partici-
pants were asked to rate the pleasantness, familiarity, and intensity
on continuous scales presented on a computer screen. Participants
had to move a vertical marker with the mouse across a horizontal
line and click to indicate their rating. Participants judged the
pleasantness of the odor from very unpleasant (left on the scale=1) to
very pleasant (right on the scale=10); the subjective familiarity from
not familiar at all (left) to very familiar (right); and the subjective
intensity from not perceived (left) to very strong (right).
Data analyses. The difference between prechoice and
postchoice ratings was calculated for each of the eight target
odors. For each participant, we assessed odor recognition memory
performance by using parameters based on signal detection theory
[46]. If the odor was presented during the experiment and
declared so by a subject, a ‘‘hit’’ was scored. If the odor was not
presented during the experiment but declared so, a ‘‘false alarm’’
was recorded. From hit and false-alarm scores, we then calculated
four parameters: hit rate (HR), false-alarm rate (FR), discrimina-
tion rate (d’L), and response bias (CL). We also assessed the
memory performance as a function of the choice by using the same
procedure, with a ‘‘hit’’ being recorded if the odor was chosen or
rejected and the participant declared so accurately. For the
analyses performed on the subjective ratings (pleasantness,
intensity, and familiarity), we defined a trial as remembered if
the participant correctly recalled the choice he or she made.
Otherwise, the trial was considered as forgotten.
Results
Pleasantness Changes Following Choice. Choice-induced
changes are typically reported when the choice is difficult, that is,
in this case, when the difference between the pleasantness ratings
of the two paired odors obtained before the choices is small. We
performed a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors period
(before choice, after choice) and choice (chosen, rejected) on the
pleasantness scores in the difficult-choice condition. The interac-
tion between these factors was significant [F(1, 40)=21.94,
p,.001, g
2=.35], revealing the classical effect of pleasantness
rating modulation after choice. Pleasantness ratings were signif-
icantly decreased for rejected odors [F(1,40)=5.40, p=.025,
g
2=.12], and pleasantness ratings were significantly increased
for chosen odors [F(1,40)=10.27, p=.003, g
2=.20]. An identical
analysis performed on the pleasantness scores in the easy-choice
condition revealed only a significant main effect of choice [F(1,
40)=100.18, p,.001, g
2=.71], which reflected significantly
higher pleasantness ratings for chosen odors than for rejected ones.
Pleasantness Changes Following Choice during the
Second Session (After 1 Week). We performed a repeated
measures ANOVA with the factors period (before choice, 1 week
after choice) and choice (chosen, rejected) on the pleasantness
scores in the difficult-choice condition. Results were similar to
those obtained just after the choice: the interaction between these
factors was significant [F(1, 40)=31.42, p,.001, g
2=.44]. This
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still present 1 week after the choice (see figure 1). Pleasantness
ratings decreased significantly for rejected odors [F(1,40)=7.94,
p=.007, g
2=.17] and pleasantness ratings increased significantly
for chosen odors [F(1,40)=28.40, p,.001, g
2=.42].
The repeated measures ANOVA with the factors period
(immediately after choice, 1 week after choice) and choice (chosen,
rejected) performed on the difference between prechoice and
postchoice ratings revealed no significant interaction between
these factors [F(1,40)=1.65, p=.206]. Taken together, these
results indicate that pleasantness rating changes were not
statistically different immediately after and 1 week after the
choice, which argues for stability over time.
In the easy-choice condition, the repeated measures ANOVA
with the factors period (before choice, one week after choice) and
choice (chosen, rejected) on the pleasantness scores only revealed a
significant main effect of choice [F(1, 40=96.30, p,.001,
g
2=.71], which reflected significantly higher pleasantness ratings
for chosen odors than for rejected ones.
The following analyses are conducted for the difficult-choice
condition only.
Memory performance. We first assessed odor recognition
memory performance. As indicated by the mean hit rate,
discrimination rate, and response bias (HR=0.90, d’L=4.76,
CL=20.03), participants remembered and well discriminated the
presented odors from the distracting odors. Memory performance
for the choice remains intermediate (HR=0.63), even though it
was significantly above chance (t test for single mean: t(40)=5.43,
p,.001).
Role of the explicit memory of the choice. Only 7 of the
41 participants had at least one rejected and one chosen odor for
both forgotten and remembered conditions. Thus, we were unable
to robustly test whether pleasantness rating change demonstrated
immediately after choices differed from those demonstrated after 1
week, according to whether choices were remembered or not.
Apparently, the memory task was not difficult enough for the
participants. Both the fact that the number of target and
distractive odors was small and the fact that they were distributed
in equal proportion (eight odors for both categories) did not favor
forgetting.
Influence of pleasantness on choices. We checked wheth-
er the pleasantness of the odor before the choice varied as a
function of the participant’s choice. A repeated measures ANOVA
with the factor choice (chosen, rejected) performed on pleasantness
scores before the choice was marginally significant [F(1,40)=3.39,
p=.078].
Congruency between choices. The likelihood of making the
same choice (either chosen or rejected) again in the second session
was far above chance [forgotten condition: t test for single mean:
t(38)=5.33, p,.001; remembered condition: t test for single mean:
t(39)=7.16, p,.001], independently of whether participants
remembered which smell they chose 1 week earlier (80%) or not
(79%) [F(1,35)=0.10, p=.758].
Familiarity and intensity ratings. The mean familiarity
and intensity ratings for all the odors are reported in Table 1.
There was neither a difference between the familiarity ratings of
the chosen and the rejected odors prior to difficult choices,
[F(1,40)=2.46, p=.124] nor between the intensity ratings
[F(1,40)=0.46, p=.502]. It is then very unlikely that choices
could have been based on a priori differences in the familiarity or
intensity ratings of the paired odors. There was a statistical
difference in familiarity ratings between chosen and rejected odors
immediately after the first choice [F(1,40=4.75, p=.035], and a
statistical trend 1 week later [F(1,40)=3.47, p=.070]. There was
neither a difference in intensity ratings immediately after the
choice [F(1,40)=0.51, p=.481] nor 1 week later [F(1,40=0.71,
p=.403]. Thus, the repetition of odor presentation did not seem
to modify the intensity ratings.
Figure 1. Pleasantness rating modulation following choice between two very similarly pleasant odors in Experiment 1. The bars on
the left represent the difference between pleasantness ratings before and just after choosing between pairs of odors. The bars on the right represent
the difference between pleasantness ratings before and 1 week after these choices. Values greater than 0 indicate an increase in pleasantness ratings
for the odor after choice and values less than 0 a decrease in pleasantness ratings. Error bars represent the standard error to the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037857.g001
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These data suggest that olfactory pleasantness ratings could be
modulated by a difficult choice in long time spans. Indeed, both 10
min and 1 week after a difficult choice, chosen odors were valuated
more positively and rejected odors were valuated less positively
compared with a first pleasantness evaluation. Thus, in addition to
replicating a long time span pleasantness rating modulation for
chosen stimuli, this study also shows such a modulation for
rejected stimuli. Furthermore, the results reveal that postchoice
pleasantness rating modulation is also present when measuring for
experienced utility and not only for predicted utility. Moreover,
the coherence of choices over time was high, even when choices
were not explicitly remembered.
In contrast to a previous experiment [7] in which six pairs of
odors were presented, this study only included four pairs of odors.
Consequently, the difficulty of the task in terms of memory was not
high enough to allow a reliable comparison between chosen and
rejected odors in both forgotten and remembered choices, as
remembered choices were much more numerous than forgotten
ones. Hence, we decided to conduct a second experiment in which
we increased the number of pairs presented to increase the
difficulty in terms of memory and consequently to be able to
compare conditions in which choices were forgotten and those in
which choices were remembered.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Thirty-five University of Geneva students (30
females, 5 males; mean age=22.4164.97 years) took part in this
experiment. Before starting the experiment, participants complet-
ed a written consent form. All participants reported a normal sense
of smell. They were individually tested and asked not to wear any
fragrance during the days of testing.
Stimuli. Twenty-six odors were used in this experiment.
Their mean ratings are provided in Table 2.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to the one used in
Study 1. The major difference was that 16 odors were used as
targets here, and consequently 8 pairs of odors were created
during the choice session (instead of 4 as in Study 1). Thus,
during this session, participants were presented with two kinds
of odor pairs: (a) four pairs of odors that they had rated as
similarly pleasant (i.e., difficult choice conditions for one half of
the trials; mean rating differences=0.1060.09 on the 10-point
subjective scale) and (b) four pairs of odors that they had rated
differently for pleasantness (i.e., easy choice conditions for one
half of the trials; mean rating differences=3.5662.55 on the 10-
point subjective scale). Another slight adaptation from Study 1
was that 10 odors were used as distractors (rather than 8 as in
Study 1).
Results
Pleasantness changes following choice. We performed a
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors period (before choice,
after choice) and choice (chosen, rejected) on the pleasantness
scores in the difficult-choice condition. The interaction between
these factors was significant [F(1,34)=29.95, p,.001, g
2=.47],
showing again the well-documented effect of pleasantness rating
change following difficult choices. Pleasantness ratings were
significantly increased for chosen odors [F(1,34)=29.63,
p,.001, g
2=.47]; the decrease in pleasantness ratings for
rejected odors was not significant [F(1,34)=2.71, p=.109]. An
identical analysis performed on the pleasantness scores in the
easy-choice condition revealed only a significant main effect of
choice [F(1, 34=131.73, p,.001, g
2=.79], which reflected
significantly higher pleasantness ratings for chosen odors than
for rejected ones.
Pleasantness changes following choices during the second
session (after 1 week). The same analyses were performed 1
week after choice. The repeated measures ANOVA with the
factors period (before choice, 1 week after choice) and choice
(chosen, rejected) performed on the pleasantness scores was
significant [F(1,34)=18.02, p,.001, g
2=.35]. This result indi-
cates that pleasantness rating modulation was still present 1 week
after the choice. Pleasantness ratings were significantly increased
for chosen odors [F(1,34)=16.06, p,.001, g
2=.32]; the decrease
in pleasantness ratings for rejected odors did not reach significance
[F(1,34)=1.19, p=.283].
The repeated measures ANOVA with the factors period
(immediately after choice, 1 week after choice) and choice (chosen,
rejected) performed on the difference between prechoice and
postchoice ratings revealed no significant interaction between
these factors [F(1,34)=0.09, p=.767]. Taken together, these
results indicate that pleasantness ratings changes were not
statistically different immediately after and 1 week after the
choice, which suggests stability over time.
In the easy-choice condition, the repeated measures ANOVA
with the factor period (before choice, one week after choice) and
choice (chosen, rejected) on the pleasantness scores only revealed a
main effect of choice [F(1, 34)\=139.47, p,.001, g
2=.80], which
reflected significantly higher pleasantness ratings for chosen odors
than for rejected ones.
The following analyses are conducted for the difficult-choice
condition only.
Memory performance. As in Study 1, participants remem-
bered and well discriminated the presented odors from the
distracting odors (mean hit rate: HR=0.85, d’L=3.46,
CL=20.27). Memory performance for the choice was again
intermediate (R=0.60), even if still significantly above chance (t
test for single mean: t(35)=4.306, p,.001).
Role of explicit memory of the choice during the first
session. To assess the role of memory for the choice in
pleasantness rating change, a repeated measures ANOVA with the
factors choice (chosen, rejected) and memory (remembered,
forgotten) was performed on the difference score in the difficult-
choice condition (after choice - before choice). This analysis
revealed a main effect only of choice, [F(1,20)=7.68, p=.012,
g
2=.28], showing that the difference between the pleasantness
evaluation increase of the chosen odors and the pleasantness
evaluation decrease of the rejected odors was significant for
forgotten and remembered choices combined. Two repeated
measures ANOVAs conducted on the difference scores for the
forgotten and remembered difficult choices separately confirmed
significant postchoice pleasantness rating change for remembered
choices, but critically, also for forgotten choices [F(1,28)=5.48,
p=.027, g
2=.16 and F(1,24)=8.29, p=.008, g
2=.26, respec-
tively] (see figure 2).
Role of explicit memory of the choice after 1 week. We
performed a repeated measures ANOVA with the factors choice
(chosen, rejected) and memory (remembered, forgotten) on the
difference scores in the difficult-choice condition (1 week after
choice – before choice). This analysis revealed a main effect of
choice [F(1,20)=7.54, p=.012, g
2=.27]. Two repeated measures
ANOVAs conducted on the difference scores for the forgotten and
remembered difficult choices separately confirmed significant
postchoice pleasantness rating change for remembered choices,
but critically, also for forgotten choices [F(1,28)=13.96, p,.001,
Long-Term Shaping Preferences of Odors by Choices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e37857T
a
b
l
e
2
.
N
a
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
1
6
T
a
r
g
e
t
O
d
o
r
s
U
s
e
d
i
n
S
t
u
d
y
2
a
n
d
T
h
e
i
r
M
e
a
n
R
a
t
i
n
g
s
.
O
d
o
r
M
e
a
n
p
l
e
a
s
a
n
t
n
e
s
s
b
e
f
o
r
e
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
p
l
e
a
s
a
n
t
n
e
s
s
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
p
l
e
a
s
a
n
t
n
e
s
s
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
(
1
w
e
e
k
l
a
t
e
r
)
M
e
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
b
e
f
o
r
e
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
(
1
w
e
e
k
l
a
t
e
r
)
M
e
a
n
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
b
e
f
o
r
e
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
(
1
w
e
e
k
l
a
t
e
r
)
D
e
t
e
r
g
e
n
t
5
.
4
7
(
6
1
.
9
0
)
5
.
8
0
(
6
1
.
8
5
)
5
.
6
5
(
6
1
.
8
3
)
6
.
0
0
(
6
2
.
7
7
)
6
.
0
1
(
6
2
.
2
0
)
5
.
9
3
(
6
2
.
4
2
)
4
.
4
7
(
6
2
.
0
0
)
3
.
9
8
(
6
2
.
3
1
)
3
.
6
8
(
6
2
.
2
9
)
S
h
a
m
p
o
o
f
r
a
g
r
a
n
c
e
7
.
6
9
(
6
1
.
3
8
)
7
.
3
4
(
6
1
.
9
0
)
7
.
7
0
(
6
1
.
4
1
)
7
.
3
0
(
6
2
.
0
3
)
7
.
5
9
(
6
2
.
1
1
)
7
.
3
5
(
6
2
.
2
9
)
6
.
1
6
(
6
1
.
9
3
)
5
.
9
9
(
6
1
.
8
9
)
6
.
1
7
(
6
1
.
8
8
)
F
i
g
f
l
o
w
e
r
5
.
7
5
(
6
2
.
1
5
)
5
.
3
2
(
6
2
.
3
7
)
5
.
7
6
(
6
2
.
1
2
)
5
.
2
1
(
6
2
.
8
1
)
5
.
2
5
(
6
2
.
2
0
)
5
.
3
7
(
6
2
.
5
4
)
6
.
1
6
(
6
1
.
8
1
)
6
.
4
7
(
6
1
.
4
1
)
6
.
1
2
(
6
1
.
8
2
)
L
i
l
a
c
f
l
o
w
e
r
6
.
5
7
(
6
2
.
1
0
)
6
.
8
0
(
6
1
.
6
5
)
6
.
9
7
(
6
1
.
8
8
)
6
.
9
2
(
6
2
.
0
8
)
6
.
3
5
(
6
2
.
0
4
)
6
.
2
2
(
6
2
.
0
5
)
5
.
8
3
(
6
2
.
0
6
)
5
.
5
1
(
6
1
.
9
5
)
4
.
7
9
(
6
2
.
2
3
)
V
i
o
l
e
t
f
l
o
w
e
r
5
.
2
6
(
6
1
.
8
2
)
5
.
8
4
(
6
2
.
1
2
)
5
.
6
8
(
6
2
.
0
8
)
4
.
0
6
(
6
2
.
2
3
)
4
.
5
4
(
6
1
.
9
7
)
4
.
6
3
(
6
2
.
3
2
)
4
.
5
3
(
6
1
.
9
5
)
5
.
0
6
(
6
2
.
1
3
)
4
.
7
2
(
6
2
.
5
0
)
Y
o
g
h
u
r
t
2
.
8
4
(
6
2
.
0
3
)
2
.
8
6
(
6
1
.
8
9
)
3
.
0
0
(
6
1
.
8
8
)
5
.
5
6
(
6
2
.
8
5
)
5
.
4
1
(
6
2
.
6
2
)
5
.
0
5
(
6
2
.
3
6
)
6
.
7
6
(
6
2
.
1
0
)
7
.
4
8
(
6
1
.
8
6
)
6
.
9
1
(
6
1
.
9
3
)
A
l
a
d
i
n
a
t
e
(
f
l
o
r
a
l
n
o
t
e
)
2
.
9
7
(
6
2
.
1
8
)
3
.
3
4
(
6
2
.
0
8
)
3
.
4
3
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
4
.
2
0
(
6
2
.
4
6
)
4
.
3
6
(
6
2
.
5
1
)
4
.
7
4
(
6
2
.
4
2
)
6
.
7
6
(
6
1
.
9
9
)
7
.
0
0
(
6
1
.
7
5
)
6
.
6
6
(
6
1
.
6
0
)
M
e
l
o
n
2
.
9
6
(
6
1
.
9
1
)
2
.
7
0
(
6
1
.
9
7
)
3
.
2
7
(
6
1
.
5
5
)
3
.
2
3
(
6
2
.
3
4
)
3
.
9
0
(
6
2
.
4
0
)
4
.
3
6
(
6
2
.
1
7
)
7
.
2
1
(
6
1
.
8
1
)
7
.
5
3
(
6
1
.
6
2
)
7
.
2
4
(
6
1
.
4
5
)
S
a
n
d
a
l
w
o
o
d
4
.
2
5
(
6
1
.
7
1
)
4
.
1
7
(
6
1
.
9
3
)
4
.
1
8
(
6
1
.
7
0
)
4
.
4
1
(
6
2
.
3
3
)
5
.
1
8
(
6
2
.
2
1
)
5
.
1
3
(
6
2
.
2
9
)
5
.
2
3
(
6
1
.
8
6
)
5
.
8
1
(
6
1
.
8
5
)
5
.
2
3
(
6
2
.
1
4
)
L
a
v
e
n
d
e
r
f
l
o
w
e
r
6
.
0
9
(
6
2
.
7
5
)
6
.
2
1
(
6
2
.
6
0
)
6
.
4
8
(
6
2
.
4
2
)
7
.
3
4
(
6
2
.
1
9
)
7
.
3
6
(
6
2
.
1
3
)
7
.
5
0
(
6
2
.
1
8
)
7
.
0
4
(
6
1
.
5
5
)
7
.
4
6
(
6
1
.
7
5
)
7
.
2
0
(
6
1
.
6
2
)
R
a
s
p
b
e
r
r
y
f
l
o
w
e
r
6
.
2
4
(
6
1
.
6
8
)
5
.
9
0
(
6
1
.
6
5
)
6
.
2
1
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
4
.
3
4
(
6
2
.
2
4
)
4
.
3
8
(
6
1
.
9
0
)
4
.
0
3
(
6
2
.
2
0
)
3
.
4
1
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
2
.
7
8
(
6
2
.
2
3
)
3
.
6
6
(
6
2
.
4
1
)
T
u
t
t
i
f
r
u
i
t
i
6
.
9
6
(
6
2
.
4
1
)
6
.
9
4
(
6
2
.
1
9
)
7
.
1
8
(
6
2
.
1
4
)
8
.
3
8
(
6
1
.
6
3
)
8
.
4
9
(
6
1
.
3
3
)
8
.
4
3
(
6
1
.
3
4
)
7
.
2
6
(
6
1
.
5
6
)
7
.
5
1
(
6
1
.
2
1
)
7
.
4
0
(
6
1
.
3
4
)
P
i
n
e
a
p
p
l
e
7
.
1
4
(
6
1
.
6
3
)
6
.
8
4
(
6
1
.
8
3
)
7
.
4
8
(
6
1
.
3
8
)
7
.
2
2
(
6
1
.
7
8
)
6
.
8
0
(
6
1
.
8
8
)
6
.
8
8
(
6
2
.
0
1
)
6
.
4
7
(
6
1
.
4
3
)
6
.
4
1
(
6
1
.
5
7
)
6
.
1
8
(
6
1
.
7
9
)
M
a
g
n
o
l
i
a
5
.
9
6
(
6
1
.
9
4
)
5
.
7
3
(
6
1
.
7
7
)
6
.
0
2
(
6
1
.
7
1
)
4
.
8
4
(
6
2
.
2
7
)
5
.
1
8
(
6
2
.
2
9
)
4
.
2
2
(
6
2
.
2
7
)
6
.
4
7
(
6
1
.
5
7
)
6
.
2
6
(
6
1
.
8
5
)
6
.
0
6
(
6
1
.
8
5
)
B
e
e
r
2
.
9
8
(
6
1
.
6
5
)
3
.
3
0
(
6
2
.
1
6
)
2
.
9
3
(
6
1
.
7
3
)
4
.
9
3
(
6
2
.
9
4
)
5
.
5
8
(
6
2
.
7
9
)
5
.
6
8
(
6
2
.
4
8
)
6
.
8
0
(
6
1
.
5
5
)
6
.
7
0
(
6
1
.
2
9
)
7
.
2
1
(
6
1
.
8
1
)
L
e
a
t
h
e
r
2
.
5
5
(
6
1
.
7
3
)
3
.
1
1
(
6
2
.
0
5
)
3
.
0
2
(
6
1
.
9
3
)
3
.
7
7
(
6
2
.
9
2
)
4
.
6
3
(
6
2
.
7
5
)
4
.
9
8
(
6
2
.
3
6
)
6
.
0
0
(
6
2
.
0
9
)
6
.
4
4
(
6
1
.
8
4
)
6
.
6
0
(
6
1
.
6
4
)
N
o
t
e
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
d
o
i
:
1
0
.
1
3
7
1
/
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
.
p
o
n
e
.
0
0
3
7
8
5
7
.
t
0
0
2
Long-Term Shaping Preferences of Odors by Choices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e37857g
2=.33 and F(1,24)=5.35, p=.030, g
2=.18, respectively] (see
figure 2).
Congruency between choices. The likelihood of making the
same choice again in the second session was far above chance
[forgotten condition: t test for single mean: t(35)=6.29, p,.001;
remembered condition: t test for single mean: t(35)=7.04,
p,.001], independently of whether participants remembered
which smell they chose 1 week earlier (82%) or not (79%)
[F(1,35)=0.49, p=.487].
Influence of pleasantness on choices. We checked wheth-
er the pleasantness of the odor before the choice varied as a
function of the participant’s choice. The repeated measures
ANOVA with the factor choice (chosen, rejected) performed on
pleasantness scores before the choice was marginally significant
[F(1,34)=3.92, p=.056] – odors evaluated as the most pleasant
before choice tend to be chosen during the choice phase.
Familiarity and intensity ratings. The mean familiarity
and intensity ratings for all the odors are reported in Table 2.
There was a difference neither between the familiarity ratings of
the chosen and the rejected odors prior to difficult choices
[F(1,34)=0.04, p=.853], nor between the intensity ratings
[F(1,34)=1.26, p=.270]. Familiarity ratings between chosen
and rejected odors were not significantly different either just after
the first choice [F(1,34)=0.11, p=.738] or 1 week after the first
choice [F(1,34)=0.13, p=.717]. Intensity ratings between chosen
and rejected odors were marginally significantly different just after
the first choice [F(1,34)=3.70, p=.062] and significantly different
1 week after the first choice [F(1,34)=5.21, p=.029, g
2=.13],
rejected odors being rated on average as more intense than chosen
odors.
As in Study 1, following a difficult choice, pleasantness ratings
were modulated–chosen odors were valuated more positively
compared with a first pleasantness evaluation–both immediately
after choice and also 1 week later. However, in contrast to the
findings of Study 1, the more negative evaluation of rejected odors,
compared with a first pleasantness evaluation, was did not reach
significance immediately after choice (statistical trend) and 1 week
later. As the mean ratings of pleasantness before choice were very
similar for both experiments (mean pleasantness ratings before
choice for Experiment 1=5.1161.59 and for Experiment
2=5.1161.75), these findings cannot be explained by an overall
differential attractiveness of the stimuli in the two experiments
[47]. Previous research has also demonstrated devaluations of
odors after their rejection [7].
Pleasantness ratings before choice tend to predict participants’
choices: odors evaluated as the most pleasant before choice tend to
also be the chosen ones. This result tends to confirm one of Chen
and Risen [34]’ assumptions, i.e. participants’ choices are, at least
partially, guided by their preferences. Choices could consequently
reveal preferences.
Increasing the number of odorants had the predicted effect: The
number of remembered and forgotten choices were more balanced
than in Experiment 1, allowing for a statistical comparison of the
impact of choice memory on postchoice pleasantness rating
modulation in both the first and the second sessions. Following
difficult choices, chosen odors were evaluated more positively and
rejected odors less positively, even when choices were not explicitly
remembered. This result provides support for the hypothesis that
implicit mechanisms underlie the observed pleasantness rating
modulation with long-term stability.
However, as described in the introduction, we cannot unequiv-
ocally conclude from Experiments 1 and 2, as based on the free-
choice paradigm [34], that choice has a modulatory impact on
preferences.
To check the validity of the conclusions we drew from
Experiments 1 and 2, i.e. that choice has a modulatory impact
on preferences and that this modulation is long-lasting, we
conducted a third experiment. The design of this experiment
was adapted from the effort-justification paradigm [48], where
Chen and Risen’s rationale does not apply. Furthermore, Chen
and Risen’s point has no bearing on our third conclusion from
Experiments 1 and 2, i.e. that postchoice preference modulation
does not require an explicit memory of the choice.
As mentioned above, the effort-justification paradigm does not
suffer from the point raised by Chen and Risen (see [41]). This
paradigm aims at experimentally demonstrating that ‘‘persons who
Figure 2. Pleasantness rating modulation following choice between two very similarly pleasant odors in Experiment 2. The bars on
the left represent the difference between pleasantness ratings before and just after choosing between pairs of odors, for both forgotten and
remembered choices. The bars on the right represent the difference between pleasantness ratings before and 1 week after these choices, again for
both forgotten and remembered choices. Values greater than 0 indicate an increase in pleasantness ratings for the odor after choice and values less
than 0 a decrease in pleasantness ratings. Error bars represent the standard error to the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037857.g002
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more highly than persons who attain the same thing with a minimum of
effort’’ (Aronson & Mills, 1959, p.177). In Aronson & Mills’
princeps study [48], participants went through either a mild or
severe initiation to join a group. Importantly, even if participants
had the feeling they were choosing to go through the initiation or
not, they actually did not – they were assigned randomly to one
of the two initiation groups. They did not choose either which
type of initiation they were going through. This is precisely
because going through a mild or severe initiation did not reveal
participants’ pre-existing preference for the group that the effort-
justification paradigm is valid [41]. After the initiation, the group
they went through the initiation for turned out to be dull.
Participants were asked to fill in 17 rating scales regarding the
group. These ratings were averaged to provide a group liking
measure. Participants who went through a severe initiation liked
the group more than participants in the mild initiation condition.
This severe initiation condition is indeed supposed to raise
cognitive dissonance [48].
We adapted this idea to our setting by adding a choice phase,
in a way that could not possibly reflect participants’ preferences
for the odors presented. Specifically, participants were asked to
decide, before each odor presentation, whether they wanted to
spend money on this trial or not. Due to the restriction that
they had to pay on exactly half the trials, participants effectively
chose for which trials they wanted to sacrifice money. Crucially,
since the monetary choice was made before smelling the odor,
this choice cannot, by definition, reflect the participant’s
preferences. We subsequently measured how this choice affected
pleasantness’ ratings of the odors both immediately and one
week after choice. The odors could be anywhere on the
pleasantness spectrum.
The hypothesis behind this design is that in cases where
participants pay for what turns out to be a bad odor, this will cause
cognitive dissonance. Thus, we expected that bad odors would be
rated less unpleasant when paid for, compared to when they were not
paid for.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Twenty-six participants were tested in the
experiment after completing a written consent form. We lost the
data of 3 of them because of technical problems, leaving the data
from 23 participants usable (20 females, mean age=23.52,
s.d.=4.58). All participants reported a normal sense of smell.
They were individually tested and were asked not to wear any
fragrance during the days of testing. They were paid 12 Swiss
francs (about 12 US Dollars) for their participation.
Stimuli. Thirty odors were used in this experiment. Their
mean ratings are provided in Table 3. Odorants were diluted in
odorless dipropylene glycol to obtain a roughly similar mean
intensity [see 4 for further details]. Solutions (4 ml) were injected
into the absorbent core of cylindrical felt-tip pens (14 cm long,
inner diameter 1.3 cm). The use of these devices (provided by
Burghart, Germany) avoids any olfactory contamination of the
environment. Each odorant was coded by a random three-digit
code.
Procedure. The present experiment was divided into two
parts, separated by 1 week. The time of day of the experimental
session was unchanged for a given participant.
First session. First, participants were requested to rate the
pleasantness, familiarity, and intensity of the twenty target
odorants. Like all the ratings they had to do, these were realized
on continuous scales presented on a computer screen. Participants
had to move a vertical marker with the mouse across a horizontal
line and click to indicate their rating. Participants judged the
pleasantness of the odor from very unpleasant (left on the scale=1) to
very pleasant (right on the scale=10); the subjective familiarity from
not familiar at all (left) to very familiar (right); and the subjective
intensity from not perceived (left) to very strong (right).
Second, participants were given 12 coins of 5 CHF
(approximately 1265$). They were told that they were going
to smell 20 smells, and that they should decide before exposure to
a given smell, whether they were going to pay nothing or 5 CHF
for it. They were further informed that in total, they had to pay
for half of the odors (10 out of 20). Since these choices were
made before knowing the odor on a given trial, the decision that
they took cannot be related to any pre-existing preference for
the odor. They were instructed to make a genuine choice before
each trial, and not to use strategies, such as for instance giving 5
CHF for the ten first odors, and then nothing, or alternate
between nothing and 5 CHF during each trial. For each trial,
o n c et h e yh a dm a d eu pt h e i rm i n da n dp a i d0o r5C H F ,t h e y
were exposed to the odor. During this choice phase, participants
were presented with two kinds of odors: (a) ten odors that they
had rated as unpleasant (i.e., for one half of the trials; mean
pleasantness rating=3.3560.86 on a 10-point subjective scale),
and (b) ten odors that they had rated as pleasant (for one half of
the trials; mean pleasantness rating=7.0861.02 on a 10-point
subjective scale described in the following paragraph). This
procedure of choosing, possibly paying, and smelling was
repeated for 20 trials.
In the next phase, participants were presented with all 20 odors
one more time, and rated each for pleasantness, familiarity and
intensity again.
Finally, participants were presented with the twenty already
presented target odors, together with ten new odors (distractors)
and were requested to indicate whether they had already smelled
each odor during the experiment. For each odor, if they answered
yes, they were then asked to specify if they had designated this
odor as chosen or rejected during the choice phase. Before being
asked to do so at the end of the experiment, participants were not
aware that they would have to complete this memory task. During
the entire experiment, the order in which odors or pairs of odors
were presented was controlled. For each presentation of an odor,
participants were instructed to smell the odor during two
inspirations at most.
Second session 1 week later. Participants were requested to
rate the pleasantness, familiarity, and intensity of the twenty
odorants.
Data analyses. In the free-choice paradigm, cognitive
dissonance is assumed to arise while choosing between difficult
pairs, i.e. pairs containing similarly liked stimuli [6]. In our new
paradigm, we expected cognitive dissonance to occur for
unpleasant odors, but not for pleasant ones. As described above,
our rationale was that spending money is normally done only for
desired outcomes. So spending money and receiving a negative
outcome would cause dissonance. This should not occur for
positive outcomes. The analyses reported here were consequently
conducted on the half of odors initially rated most unpleasant, on
an individual basis.
Results
Choice-induced changes of preferences for odors. The
repeated measures ANOVA with the factor choice (0 CHF, 5
CHF) performed on the difference between pleasantness
prechoice and postchoice ratings was significant
Long-Term Shaping Preferences of Odors by Choices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e37857T
a
b
l
e
3
.
N
a
m
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
T
w
e
n
t
y
O
d
o
r
s
U
s
e
d
i
n
S
t
u
d
y
3
a
n
d
T
h
e
i
r
M
e
a
n
R
a
t
i
n
g
s
.
O
d
o
r
M
e
a
n
p
l
e
a
s
a
n
t
n
e
s
s
b
e
f
o
r
e
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
p
l
e
a
s
a
n
t
n
e
s
s
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
p
l
e
a
s
a
n
t
n
e
s
s
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
(
1
w
e
e
k
l
a
t
e
r
)
M
e
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
b
e
f
o
r
e
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
f
a
m
i
l
i
a
r
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
(
1
w
e
e
k
l
a
t
e
r
)
M
e
a
n
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
b
e
f
o
r
e
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
M
e
a
n
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
a
f
t
e
r
c
h
o
i
c
e
(
1
w
e
e
k
l
a
t
e
r
)
A
l
a
d
i
n
a
t
e
(
F
l
o
r
a
l
n
o
t
e
)
4
.
3
9
(
6
2
.
8
0
)
4
.
7
7
(
6
2
.
7
5
)
4
.
9
3
(
6
2
.
4
2
)
4
.
3
9
(
6
2
.
6
5
)
4
.
9
0
(
6
2
.
3
5
)
4
.
7
4
(
6
1
.
9
7
)
7
.
4
6
(
6
1
.
6
8
)
7
.
6
8
(
6
1
.
5
5
)
7
.
5
3
(
6
2
.
0
2
)
M
i
n
t
5
.
5
2
(
6
2
.
0
2
)
6
.
3
0
(
6
2
.
2
6
)
6
.
1
3
(
6
2
.
5
3
)
7
.
5
2
(
6
2
.
2
4
)
7
.
8
7
(
6
1
.
8
4
)
7
.
7
7
(
6
2
.
6
4
)
6
.
9
0
(
6
1
.
4
3
)
6
.
8
5
(
6
1
.
6
4
)
7
.
1
2
(
6
1
.
5
5
)
S
a
n
d
a
l
w
o
o
d
3
.
0
8
(
6
1
.
9
7
)
2
.
8
8
(
6
1
.
4
1
)
2
.
9
3
(
6
1
.
9
9
)
3
.
7
4
(
6
3
.
1
3
)
3
.
8
2
(
6
2
.
2
1
)
4
.
3
2
(
6
2
.
2
4
)
5
.
7
3
(
6
2
.
4
2
)
6
.
4
4
(
6
1
.
5
7
)
6
.
4
3
(
6
1
.
9
6
)
O
r
a
n
g
e
6
.
4
7
(
6
2
.
0
0
)
7
.
2
3
(
6
1
.
7
7
)
6
.
7
9
(
6
1
.
9
8
)
6
.
7
3
(
6
2
.
1
3
)
7
.
1
1
(
6
1
.
9
7
)
6
.
5
9
(
6
2
.
3
5
)
6
.
6
3
(
6
1
.
5
7
)
6
.
4
6
(
6
1
.
2
7
)
6
.
5
1
(
6
1
.
7
1
)
L
a
v
e
n
d
e
r
5
.
1
9
(
6
2
.
4
0
)
5
.
0
1
(
6
1
.
9
5
)
5
.
5
2
(
6
2
.
1
8
)
5
.
5
6
(
6
2
.
4
6
)
6
.
0
0
(
6
2
.
2
8
)
6
.
3
8
(
6
2
.
3
8
)
6
.
3
2
(
6
1
.
8
7
)
6
.
8
1
(
6
1
.
3
9
)
6
.
8
0
(
6
1
.
5
6
)
B
a
s
i
l
4
.
4
9
(
6
2
.
5
2
)
4
.
9
1
(
6
2
.
2
6
)
4
.
8
0
(
6
2
.
0
2
)
6
.
1
0
(
6
2
.
0
1
)
5
.
8
8
(
6
2
.
2
0
)
5
.
8
9
(
6
2
.
1
7
)
6
.
8
9
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
6
.
6
1
(
6
1
.
9
1
)
6
.
5
2
(
6
2
.
0
2
)
V
i
o
l
e
t
f
l
o
w
e
r
5
.
6
6
(
6
2
.
0
3
)
5
.
0
5
(
6
1
.
8
6
)
5
.
6
6
(
6
1
.
5
0
)
3
.
6
7
(
6
2
.
2
0
)
4
.
0
6
(
6
1
.
7
5
)
4
.
3
3
(
6
1
.
8
9
)
3
.
4
2
(
6
2
.
4
4
)
5
.
1
1
(
6
1
.
9
0
)
5
.
4
7
(
6
1
.
6
0
)
F
i
g
f
l
o
w
e
r
4
.
3
4
(
6
2
.
4
0
)
3
.
4
9
(
6
1
.
7
2
)
4
.
8
2
(
6
1
.
8
3
)
4
.
3
7
(
6
2
.
5
8
)
4
.
9
0
(
6
1
.
7
4
)
5
.
0
6
(
6
1
.
9
6
)
6
.
1
3
(
6
1
.
6
1
)
6
.
7
6
(
6
1
.
6
6
)
6
.
7
2
(
6
1
.
6
7
)
C
a
k
e
5
.
2
3
(
6
2
.
8
8
)
5
.
4
0
(
6
3
.
1
3
)
5
.
4
0
(
6
2
.
8
4
)
5
.
7
9
(
6
2
.
8
1
)
6
.
5
5
(
6
2
.
6
4
)
6
.
0
0
(
6
2
.
6
2
)
6
.
7
2
(
6
1
.
7
3
)
7
.
3
9
(
6
1
.
6
2
)
7
.
4
4
(
6
1
.
7
9
)
P
e
a
c
h
6
.
8
8
(
6
1
.
6
9
)
6
.
0
0
(
6
2
.
0
2
)
6
.
0
1
(
6
2
.
1
9
)
5
.
5
7
(
6
2
.
3
1
)
5
.
7
2
(
6
2
.
2
6
)
4
.
8
9
(
6
2
.
0
7
)
5
.
8
1
(
6
2
.
0
3
)
5
.
9
5
(
6
1
.
9
6
)
5
.
9
0
(
6
1
.
7
3
)
I
n
c
e
n
s
e
3
.
2
1
(
6
1
.
9
5
)
3
.
4
8
(
6
1
.
4
9
)
3
.
6
2
(
6
1
.
8
2
)
5
.
3
8
(
6
2
.
3
8
)
5
.
5
2
(
6
2
.
1
4
)
4
.
5
0
(
6
2
.
3
9
)
7
.
2
6
(
6
1
.
7
4
)
6
.
8
4
(
6
1
.
7
2
)
6
.
0
0
(
6
1
.
7
2
)
S
t
r
a
w
b
e
r
r
y
7
.
1
9
(
6
2
.
0
7
)
6
.
3
0
(
6
2
.
0
2
)
7
.
3
8
(
6
1
.
4
4
)
5
.
7
8
(
6
2
.
5
5
)
5
.
9
9
(
6
1
.
7
6
)
6
.
5
6
(
6
2
.
1
4
)
6
.
6
4
(
6
1
.
6
8
)
6
.
7
0
(
6
1
.
6
8
)
6
.
5
3
(
6
1
.
3
5
)
L
i
l
a
c
6
.
1
8
(
6
2
.
8
8
)
6
.
6
9
(
6
2
.
2
0
)
7
.
1
7
(
6
1
.
5
3
)
6
.
6
0
(
6
2
.
2
8
)
6
.
8
8
(
6
1
.
9
9
)
6
.
8
1
(
6
1
.
8
4
)
6
.
3
9
(
6
2
.
1
1
)
6
.
2
3
(
6
1
.
7
4
)
6
.
5
3
(
6
2
.
0
5
)
L
i
c
h
e
n
4
.
8
1
(
6
2
.
0
6
)
4
.
3
6
(
6
1
.
6
8
)
4
.
2
3
(
6
1
.
6
4
)
4
.
7
9
(
6
2
.
6
7
)
4
.
4
4
(
6
2
.
0
4
)
4
.
1
8
(
6
1
.
5
0
)
5
.
0
6
(
6
2
.
0
1
)
5
.
6
7
(
6
1
.
8
0
)
5
.
2
6
(
6
2
.
6
2
)
M
a
n
g
o
5
.
5
2
(
6
2
.
6
3
)
4
.
8
9
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
5
.
2
5
(
6
1
.
2
3
)
5
.
3
3
(
6
2
.
6
1
)
5
.
2
2
(
6
2
.
1
9
)
5
.
1
1
(
6
2
.
0
3
)
6
.
3
7
(
6
1
.
6
0
)
6
.
8
8
(
6
1
.
6
6
)
6
.
4
7
(
6
1
.
7
6
)
C
h
o
c
o
l
a
t
e
5
.
8
0
(
6
2
.
4
8
)
5
.
2
1
(
6
2
.
2
4
)
5
.
6
5
(
6
1
.
8
7
)
5
.
4
2
(
6
2
.
3
4
)
5
.
7
5
(
6
2
.
4
6
)
5
.
0
5
(
6
2
.
5
0
)
3
.
7
6
(
6
2
.
3
3
)
4
.
3
5
(
6
2
.
1
4
)
4
.
1
6
(
6
2
.
3
4
)
N
a
k
h
l
a
t
o
b
a
c
c
o
6
.
9
5
(
6
2
.
3
8
)
6
.
5
4
(
6
1
.
7
8
)
6
.
7
6
(
6
2
.
2
2
)
5
.
8
8
(
6
2
.
2
4
)
6
.
3
2
(
6
1
.
5
4
)
6
.
5
5
(
6
2
.
2
9
)
5
.
9
7
(
6
1
.
7
5
)
6
.
2
4
(
6
1
.
7
0
)
6
.
2
4
(
6
1
.
8
1
)
R
o
s
e
m
a
r
y
5
.
0
7
(
6
2
.
3
7
)
5
.
3
5
(
6
1
.
9
9
)
5
.
2
7
(
6
2
.
2
8
)
7
.
1
9
(
6
2
.
3
7
)
6
.
8
1
(
6
1
.
7
9
)
6
.
3
3
(
6
2
.
0
5
)
7
.
5
4
(
6
1
.
4
4
)
7
.
2
9
(
6
1
.
3
3
)
6
.
9
9
(
6
1
.
5
7
)
D
e
t
e
r
g
e
n
t
5
.
6
8
(
6
2
.
4
5
)
5
.
5
4
(
6
2
.
9
7
)
5
.
7
3
(
6
2
.
4
4
)
8
.
0
9
(
6
1
.
5
2
)
7
.
7
0
(
6
2
.
1
0
)
7
.
8
1
(
6
1
.
5
1
)
6
.
7
2
(
6
1
.
2
6
)
7
.
2
9
(
6
1
.
3
4
)
6
.
4
5
(
6
1
.
5
1
)
L
e
a
t
h
e
r
2
.
6
2
(
6
1
.
6
8
)
2
.
3
1
(
6
1
.
4
4
)
1
.
9
9
(
6
1
.
5
4
)
3
.
4
4
(
6
2
.
5
5
)
3
.
7
2
(
6
2
.
4
3
)
2
.
9
5
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
6
.
1
9
(
6
2
.
3
5
)
7
.
0
7
(
6
1
.
8
0
)
6
.
5
5
(
6
1
.
9
2
)
N
o
t
e
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
d
o
i
:
1
0
.
1
3
7
1
/
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
.
p
o
n
e
.
0
0
3
7
8
5
7
.
t
0
0
3
Long-Term Shaping Preferences of Odors by Choices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e37857[F(1,22)=7.67, p=.011, g
2=.26]. Unpleasant odors on which
participants chose to spend 5 CHF were evaluated as
significantly more pleasant than odors for which participants
did not spend money on (see Figure 3).
Choice-induced changes of preferences for odors during
the second session (after 1 week). A repeated measures
ANOVA with the factor choice (chosen, rejected) performed on
the difference between prechoice and postchoice ratings was
significant [F(1,22)=6.72, p=.017, g
2=.23]. Unpleasant odors
on which participants chose to spend 5 CHF were evaluated as
significantly more pleasant one week later than odors for which
participants did not spend money on.
The repeated measures ANOVA with the factors period
(immediately after choice, 1 week after choice) and choice
(0 CHF, 5 CHF) performed on the difference between prechoice
and postchoice ratings revealed no significant interaction between
these factors [F(1,22)=17.50, p,.001, g
2=.44]. Taken together,
these results indicate that pleasantness ratings changes were not
statistically different immediately after and 1 week after the choice,
which suggests stability over time.
Memory performances. Participants remembered and well
discriminated the presented odors from the distracting odors
(mean hit rate: HR=0.86, d’L=3.33, CL=20.38). Memory
performance for the choice was not significantly above chance
(HR=0.49, t(22)=20.45, p=.657).
Familiarity and intensity ratings. The mean familiarity
and intensity ratings for all the odors are reported in Table 2.
Familiarity ratings between odors for which participants spent
0 vs. 5 CHF were neither significantly different just after the first
choice [F(1,22)=1.14, p=.297] nor 1 week after the first choice
[F(1,22)=1.38, p=.253]. Likewise, intensity ratings between
odors for which participants spent 0 vs. 5 CHF were neither
significantly different just after the first choice [F(1,22)=0.59,
p=.451], nor 1 week after the first choice [F(1,22=0.43,
p=.518].
Discussion
The data show that olfactory preferences can be modulated by a
monetary choice across long time spans. Both 10 min and 1 week
after a difficult choice, unpleasant odors on which participants had
spent 5 CHF, were evaluated more positively compared to a first
pleasantness evaluation than odors participants did not spend
money on.
Crucially, participants were not presented with the odor prior to
their payment choice. Their choice cannot consequently reveal
their pre-existing preferences. This suggests that the results
obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 are robust to settings in which
Chen and Risen’s [34] valid critique does not apply. The results
that choice has a modulatory impact on preferences and that this
modulation is long-lasting are therefore more than a mere artifact
of the free choice paradigm.
The result that preference modulation after difficult choice in
Experiments 1 and 2 did not require an explicit memory of the
choice is not directly discussed by Chen and Risen [34].
Nevertheless due to the inclusion of choice memory as a variable,
the design of Experiment 3 in principle also permits a validation of
this result. However, as the memory of the choice was at random
level in Experiment 3, we could not conclusively interpret the trials
that were correctly remembered as something other than chance.
In particular, this means it would be misleading to split the data
into remembered vs. forgotten trials, in order to analyze
differences along this dimension. If anything, it seems to indicate
that choice-induced preference modulation did not require an
explicit memory of the choice to occur.
Figure 3. Pleasantness rating modulation for unpleasant odors following monetary choice in Experiment 3. Choice was between
spending no money (0 CHF) vs. 5 CHF (approximately 5$) to be delivered, unknowingly, with unpleasant odors. The bars on the left represent the
difference between pleasantness ratings before and just after choosing between pairs of odors. The bars on the right represent the difference
between pleasantness ratings before and 1 week after these choices. Error bars represent the standard error to the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037857.g003
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The two first experiments of this manuscript have shown that
after a choice between two odors that are perceived as equally
pleasant, pleasantness ratings for these odors were changed in the
long run. The second experiment shows that it holds true even
when the choice made was not explicitly remembered. Results
therefore suggest not only that pleasantness ratings change
following a difficult choice remains stable for at least 1 week, but
also that this stability can take place even when the choice has
been forgotten. The third experiment addresses a potential flaw of
the free-choice paradigm and shows that the fundamental results
hold even when Chen and Risen’s [34] valid point, i.e. pre-existing
preferences could explain post-choice preference modulation, is
taken into account.
Experienced Utility Versus Predicted Utility
In these three studies, participants were asked to rate the
pleasantness of actually presented odors. Thus, along with the
results of Coppin and colleagues [7], our findings extend results
found in measuring predicted utility (e.g., [49]), where participants
had to imagine how pleasant it would be to go to a given vacation
destination) by showing that postchoice preference changes can
also be found in experienced utility.
Long Term for Both Chosen and Rejected Stimuli
The results from our two first experiments, obtained using a
variant of the free-choice paradigm, suggest that olfactory
pleasantness ratings can be modulated by a difficult choice in
long time spans. Both 10 min and 1 week after a difficult choice,
chosen odors were evaluated more positively (Experiments 1 and
2) and rejected odors were evaluated less positively (Experiment 1)
compared with a first pleasantness evaluation.
Impact of Choice on Preferences
In Experiment 3, a design derived from the effort-justification
paradigm [48] was used. More precisely, participants were
making choices about odors before smelling them. In this context,
choice cannot be a reflection of pre-existing preferences. The
issue raised by Chen and Risen [34], i.e. measured postchoice
preference change may not necessarily be driven by an influence
of choice on preferences, but could be due to the fact that
choices reveal information about pre-existing preferences, cannot
consequently apply. Yet, postchoice preference modulation was
still reliably shown and demonstrated to be stable over time. The
results from this third experiment are interesting for two reasons.
First, they are an important complement to Experiments 1 and
2, as they allow concluding unequivocally that choices does have
a modulatory influence on preferences, and that this influence is
long-lasting. Second, they contribute to the current debate
regarding the influence of choice on preferences (e.g., [33–
38,40]). Getting around the issue raised by Chen and Risen [34]
when studying the impact of choice on preference now appears
as crucial for future work. Risen and Chen [41] have mentioned
four potential promising strategies in this respect. In ‘‘removing the
information from choice’’ (the third strategy proposed by Risen &
Chen [41]), the design of our third experiment, i.e. using a
choice phase before the actual presentation of the stimuli on which
a choice is made, proves to be potentially promising for future
work.
Choice Coherence
In Experiments 1 and 2, choice coherence–the likelihood of
making a second choice similar to the first one–was high, even
after 1 week. Such a result has a limited impact because we cannot
exclude that this high choice coherence is based on a preexisting
difference in pleasantness between chosen and rejected odors
before the second choice. In other words, following the first choice
phase, chosen odors were on average rated as much more pleasant
than the rejected ones. It could have made the second choice an
‘‘easy’’ one, mainly driven by this pleasantness difference between
the paired odors.
Implicit Long-Term Stability
A growing body of research has explored the implicit
mechanisms underlying preference modulation by choice (e.g.,
[35,40,49,50]) and when the first choice is not explicitly
remembered [7,18].
Aldrovandi and Heussen [51] argued that ‘‘although memory is
clearly involved in the processes of judgments and decision,
memory cannot be a good candidate to provide the stability of
preferences’’ (p. 2–3). In terms of psychological mechanisms, the
result that postchoice preference modulation does not require an
explicit memory of choice seems to challenge traditional accounts
based on cognitive dissonance reduction, which emphasize
cognitive accessibility [11,14–16]. This conscious form of cognitive
dissonance reduction can consequently be excluded as the only
determinant of the preference modulation that occurred in the
studies we presented here. However, if, as suggested notably by
Jarcho and colleagues [13], cognitive dissonance reduction could
be achieved in an unconscious fashion, then our results could be
interpreted as evidence for such a mechanism. This would imply
that different drivers of preference modulation may operate at the
same time at different levels of processing. The differentiation and
consolidation theory [52,53] also suggests that postdecision
differentiation (also called consolidation) processes, leading to a
perceived congruency between a decision and current attitudes,
may be unconscious [52].
Conclusion
Our results have implications for a link between flexibility and
stability of preferences: The current findings reveal how arbitrary-
seeming momentary decisions can have a surprisingly long-term
effect on preferences, and that this is true even if the triggering decisions
are forgotten. The asymmetry between the fleetingness of the cause
and the long-lastingness of its effect is particularly striking because
it can operate independently from conscious recollection.
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